Inside GNSS Media & Research

JUL-AUG 2018

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www.insidegnss.com J U L Y / A U G U S T 2 0 1 8 Inside GNSS 33 G NSS technology plays an important role in an ever expanding range of safety, security, business and policy critical applications. Many parts of critical infrastructures rely on uninterrupted access to GNSS positioning, navigation and timing services, but, at the same time, threats to denial of GNSS services are increasing. Radio frequency inter- ference can be unintentionally emitted by commercial high power transmit- ters, ultra-wideband radar, television, VHF, mobile satellite services and personal electronic devices. Moreover, malicious intentional interference is produced by jammers, whose rapid dif- fusion is becoming a severe threat to GNSS. To ensure GNSS is protected, there is now a need to respond at an inter- national level to ensure that there is: i) a common standard for real-world GNSS threat monitoring and report- ing, and ii) a global standard for assess- ing the performance of GNSS receivers and applications under threat. GNSS threat-reporting standards would allow for compilation of real-world threats into a database that could be analyzed to develop GNSS receiver test standards that ensure new applications are validated against the latest threats. Both standards are missing across all civil application domains and are considered a barrier to the wider adop- tion and success of GNSS in the higher value markets. is article discusses the STRIKE3 project that was specifically developed to address the issues outlined above. STRIKE3 Overview e STRIKE3 (Standardizsation of GNSS reat reporting and Receiver testing through International Knowl- edge Exchange, Experimentation and Exploitation) project is a European initiative that addresses the need to monitor, detect and characterize GNSS threats to support the increasing use of GNSS within safety, security, gov- ernmental and regulated applications. STRIKE3 has deployed an interna- tional network of GNSS interference monitoring sites that monitor interfer- ence on a global scale and capture real- world threats for analysis and to ulti- mately test GNSS receiver resilience. Using thousands of threats collect- ed from their network over a three-year period, STRIKE3 has developed a base- line set of threats that can be used to assess performance of different GNSS receivers under a range of typical real- world interference/jamming threats. e resulting specification consists of five different threats: wide swept fre- quency with fast repeat rate, narrow band signal at L1 carrier frequency, tri- angular and triangular wave swept fre- quency and tick swept frequency. For details of how these five threats were selected, refer to the Additional Read- ing section at the end of the article. Finally, the STRIKE3 project has begun using its test specification to test receiver performance in the presence of various threats. Below is a discussion of how this is done as well as some results for a specific type of interference. Collectively, the above activities aim to improve mitigation and resil- ience of future GNSS receivers against interference threats. Receiver Testing e main objectives of the testing component of the STRIKE3 project are: first, to validate the proposed test- GNSS Solutions is a regular column featuring questions and answers about technical aspects of GNSS. Readers are invited to send their questions to the columnist, Dr. Mark Petovello , Department of Geomatics Engineering, University of Calgary, who will find experts to answer them. His e-mail address can be found with his biography below. GNSS SOLUTIONS Mark Petovello is a professor (on leave) at the University of Calgary. He has been actively involved in many aspects of positioning and navigation since 1997 and has led several research and development efforts involving Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), software receivers, inertial navigation systems (INS) and other multi-sensor systems. E-mail: mark.petovello@gmail.com How can we ensure GNSS receivers are robust to real-world interference threats?

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