Inside GNSS Media & Research

JUL-AUG 2019

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28 InsideGNSS J U L Y / A U G U S T 2 0 1 9 G NSS open signals authentica- tion has become an active dis- cussion for implementation at system level with all major system pro- viders considering to adopt a solution, with Europe's Galileo the earliest sys- tem that has declared future upcoming service implementations. At the time of writing of this article, the requirements for GNSS authentication are still di er- ent for each application. To date, the proposed solutions have considered only asymmetric schemes in order to avoid the use of secure dedi- cated hardware in the receiver to pro- tect the integrity and con dentiality of the symmetric cryptographic material. However, with demanding require- ments for robust PNT and authentica- tion rising quickly, and with a lifecycle of the space sector that exceeds 20 years from design to service deployment, it is time to investigate alternative solutions. e satellite television industry has a long track record in the use of sym- metric key schemes with smartcards and hardware security modules for the purpose of data access control and user management. Indeed, it has an equal- ly long track record of vulnerabilities, There are strong proponents for GNSS authentication implementation at the system level with all major constellations considering to adopt a solution. Here the authors present an innovate design for GNSS authentication implementation at system and receiver level that can satisfy a large number of user requirements, in terms of robustness and performances, by introducing the concept of smartcards for GNSS authentication processing. OSCAR POZZOBON ANDREA DALLA CHIARA LUCA CANZIAN SAMUELE FANTINATO CARLO SARTO GIOVANNI GAMBA QASCOM S.R.L. Multi-Tier GNSS Signal Authentication Could smartcard be an integral part of future GNSS authenticated services? attacks and mitigations solutions that have been developed in the last 30 years. S m a r t c a r d s a n d c o m m e r c i a l Hardware Security Modules (HSM) are becoming a technology available in every single device, for example tele- visions, mobile phones, vehicles, and recently even smart watches with eSIM. Hardware security implementation is not new in civil GNSS, as it has been demonstrated in 2009 by the TIGER trusted GNSS receiver (Figure 1), which used a hardware security supervisor to control a tamper mesh and store sensib- le cryptographic information. With the modernization of signals, these type of security architectures might beco- me a standard in some speci c GNSS applications. This article investigates if and how future GNSS authentication can offer WORKING PAPERS FIGURE 1 TIGER Trusted GNSS Receiver.

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