Inside GNSS Media & Research

JUL-AUG 2019

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Page 34 of 67 J U L Y / A U G U S T 2 0 1 9 Inside GNSS 35 be in common to generate the KEA codes). is would result in a correlation loss that would not pass the security threshold ( Figure 8 ). It is denoted by g(r,s) the probability that a single KEA authentication check performed by a user is successful, given that only a part of length of the code interval of length that the user correlates is correctly generated (it is remarked that the total KEA code interval length is , but the user correlates only the part of length associated to its session keys). In the nominal situation, in which the user is tracking the authentic signal, r=s, hence g(s,s) should be close to 1. Instead, if r

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